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Abstract  
 
Electricity reform typically involves little 
regard to the possibility that customer 
ownership might substitute for the “protections” 
of state ownership, or for investor ownership 
under regulatory safeguards, where market 
power is a concern. Recognising that regulation 
is itself costly, and that market contracting, 
ownership and regulation are partly 
substitutable forms of governance, this paper 
argues that state ownership of natural 
monopolies in electricity distribution (and 
transmission) is inefficient. Unregulated 
customer ownership of these activities is 
superior, better aligning monopolist and 
customer incentives at lower cost. Even 
unregulated investor ownership of distribution is 
predicted to better balance the costs of market 
contracting, ownership and regulation than 
does state ownership. Regulation of customer-
owned distribution (and transmission) is also 
shown to be inefficient, imposing regulatory 
costs without compensatory gains. Examples of 
widespread customer ownership of distribution 
in New Zealand, and of distribution and 
sometimes transmission in the US, illustrates 
how such ownership has evolved as an 
effective substitute for regulation. Policy 
implications are drawn. 
 
                                                                          
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
What sense does it make to subject a 
customer-owned distribution company to 
price controls, since those customers share 
in any of its monopoly profits or can align 
its objectives more closely with their own? 
Similarly, why subject a state- or customer-
owned grid company to price regulation? 
More generally, what role does ownership 
play in mitigating concerns about market 
power exercised by natural monopolies 
such as those in electricity distribution and 
transmission, and how should regulation be 
crafted to recognise and accommodate any 
such role? As Hart and Moore (1998, p. 41) 
put it, “the ownership of assets confers 
power”, so it is natural to ask whether 
ownership is more or less powerful than 
regulation in protecting customers against 
monopolies in electricity. 
These questions subsume but extend 
the familiar debate regarding the relative 
efficiency of state and private ownership, 
and questions regarding the relative 
efficacy of different types of regulation. 
They recognise that different classes of 
natural monopoly owners face different 
risks of market power abuse. This then 
motivates consideration of whether 
regulation is efficient under all classes of 
monopoly ownership, and whether it limits 
efficient ownership options. 
The aim of this paper is to show the 
overlaps between market contracting, 
ownership and regulation as means of 
aligning the interests of customers and 
natural monopolies in electricity – i.e. as 
“governance” mechanisms following the 
definition of Tirole (2001). This definition is 
  
given content using the framework of 
Hansmann (1996), showing that ownership 
efficiently belongs with the parties 
minimising the combined costs of market 
contracting, ownership and regulation. The 
analysis concentrates on electricity 
distribution, but is later extended to 
transmission. For simplicity it is assumed 
that transmission and distribution are 
unbundled from competitive activities such 
as generation and energy retailing.  
The paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 describes examples of customer 
ownership of distribution and transmission. 
Section 3 explores the costs of regulation. 
Section 4 sets out the scheme under which 
different ownership and regulation 
arrangements are compared. The 
alternatives are assessed in Section 5. 
Section 6 extends the analysis to 
transmission. Section 7 draws policy 
implications and concludes. 
 
2. EXAMPLES OF CUSTOMER-OWNED 
DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSMISSION 
 
Consideration of ownership’s role in 
mitigating market power is warranted in the 
light of examples where customers 
voluntary adopt ownership of distribution 
(and even transmission). Hansmann (1996) 
notes that while investor-owned utilities 
(IOUs) dominate electricity supply in the 
US, rural customer electricity cooperatives 
formed since the 1940s number almost 
1,000, appear in 46 of 50 states, own 
almost 45% of all lines, cover 67% of the 
nation’s land area, and supply around 10% 
of the population. Municipal electric utilities, 
a more diffuse form of customer ownership, 
number 1,500 and serve a larger and more 
diverse customer base. Smaller electricity 
cooperatives in turn band together to own 
upstream generation and transmission 
(G&T) cooperatives (Hansmann (1996), 
Burr (2004)). Such US cooperatives are 
operated to minimise operating costs while 
maintaining service levels. While they are 
non-profit and do not seek to earn 
monopoly rents, they might still manifest 
market power in terms of (e.g.) cost 
inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies could be 
exacerbated by their non-tradable 
ownership (Karpoff and Rice (1989), Porter 
and Scully (1987)). Yet many customers 
have opted for this form of ownership. 
Similarly, when New Zealand’s urban 
and rural electricity customers were given a 
choice over distribution ownership in 1992, 
they predominantly opted for ownership of 
already for-profit distribution companies by 
customer trusts (Evans and Meade (2005)). 
This entitles customers to share in 
distribution company profits, providing a 
compensation for any excess profits arising 
from market power in some proportion to 
each customer’s level of demand. A driving 
force behind such customer ownership in 
both the US and New Zealand has been 
the mitigation of potential market power 
abuse by these natural monopolies. This 
mirrors, for example, the formation of 
supplier cooperatives to mitigate 
downstream market power in dairy 
processing (Porter and Scully (1987)). 
Importantly, while IOUs have been 
subject to rate regulation for much of the 
past century, most US rural electricity 
cooperatives have long escaped the 
regulatory net. As of June 2003, 47% of 
them were not subject to rate regulation, 
and a further 19% were subject to optional 
regulation, with those opting out of 
regulation outweighing those opting in by 
almost 8:1 (www.nreca.coop). Where rate 
regulation is applied it is sometimes 
“streamlined” relative to that applied to 
IOUs. Notably, even G&T cooperatives are 
in some cases permitted to avoid rate 
regulation, even though they are more 
removed from their ultimate customers than 
their distribution counterparts, and hence 
offer more diffuse protection against market 
power abuse. While these arrangements 
might be argued to reflect regulatory 
capture (Stigler (1971), but see also 
Joskow and Rose (1989)), Hansmann 
(1996) argues it instead reflects a natural 
balancing of costs (more below). He 
concludes (p. 170) that “By aligning the 
firm’s interests with those of its customers, 
cooperatives can avoid not only the costs 
of monopoly but also the costs of rate 
regulation.” 
By contrast, New Zealand customer 
ownership of distribution was adopted 
when only general competition law 
protections were offered against market 
power abuse – so-called “light-handed” 
  
regulation. Since 2003, however, even 
customer-owned distribution has been 
subjected to CPI-X price controls similar to 
those commonly applied elsewhere, 
despite falling real distribution costs (Evans 
and Meade (2005)). This then begs the 
question – if customer ownership has long 
proved an effective bulwark against market 
power abuse in the US, is it necessary or 
useful to uniformly regulate natural 
monopolies in electricity across all 
ownership classes?  
 
3. COSTS OF REGULATION 
 
The imperfections of various types of 
regulation are well known (e.g., see 
Newbery (1998), Sappington (2002)). More 
fundamentally, the “nirvana” view of 
government and regulators operating 
wisely, benevolently and costlessly with full 
information, has long been abandoned 
(Joskow and Rose (1989), Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2002)). Instead, a more sober 
view of regulation has emerged after years 
of regulatory experience, recognising the 
direct and indirect costs regulation entails. 
The direct costs of regulation are 
apparent and large. Regulators face their 
own administration costs. Regulated firms 
face regulatory compliance costs, and like 
customers, regulatory participation costs 
(including the costs of lobbying and 
collective action). These costs fall to 
customers either wholly or in some part. 
From the customer’s perspective, the 
indirect costs of regulation are equally 
clear. Regulatory objectives can be mis-
specified by legislators, whether due to 
imperfect understanding of customer 
preferences, process capture by 
concentrated interests, other voting system 
imperfections, or outright conflict between 
government and customer interests. 
Similarly, regulators can misapply even 
well-specified objectives, whether due to 
imperfections in regulatory models, 
information asymmetries relative to both 
regulated firms and customers, simple 
human fallibility, or regulator self-interest 
(such as the vested interest in perpetuating 
and expanding regulation for the sake of 
ongoing tenure, irrespective of customer 
interests). Where the right goals are not 
specified, not pursued, or pursued with cost 
and error, customers’ interests cannot be 
assumed to be served. 
Additionally, regulation itself gives rise to 
distortions. It inherently influences prices, 
costs, quality, investment and bankruptcy 
risk in both intended and unintended ways. 
It affects both efficiency and distributional 
equity. Regulatory constraints can become 
self-fulfilling prophecies, pre-empting any 
actual competitive pressures on regulated 
firms. And lags, costs and frictions in 
changing regulation mean it can outlive its 
usefulness, and is slow to respond to 
changing circumstances or shocks. 
Combined with governments’ inability to 
make credible regulatory commitments, its 
very application raises investment risks 
affecting the timing, scale and nature of 
regulated firm investments, impacting 
current and future prices, quantities and 
qualities. All of these imply costs to 
customers. 
It is therefore no surprise that calls are 
growing for feedback mechanisms to be 
added to the regulatory process, including 
merit reviews of regulatory decisions (e.g. 
House of Lords (2004)). As noted by Helm 
(1994, p. 18), “Intervention by government 
is only efficient if the costs of the market 
failures it addresses exceed the costs of 
intervention . . . Market failures must 
exceed regulatory failures.” Indeed, 
Glachant (2002, p. 4) states that “public 
regulation is not better in principle than 
private negotiation for dealing with market 
failure.” Given the costs of regulation, it is 
natural to ask whether existing or feasible 
alternatives to regulation might better serve 
customer interests. 
 
4. COMPARATIVE SCHEME 
 
4.1. Market Contracting, Ownership and 
Regulation as forms of Governance 
 
Tirole (2001, p. 4) defines corporate 
governance as “the design of institutions 
that induce or force management to 
internalize the welfare of stakeholders.” In 
this context the importance of customers as 
a relevant stakeholder class is presumed, 
as the protection of customers from market 
power abuse by distribution is a common 
concern of electricity reformers. Here 
management is taken to mean those who 
  
run distribution companies, and who set 
their pricing and investment policies and 
control operating costs. Assuming that our 
goal is to best induce distribution managers 
to serve the interests of their customers, 
we thus have a governance problem. 
This construction highlights the fact that 
market contracting, regulation and 
ownership occupy overlapping points on 
the governance spectrum. Where 
distribution companies are owned by 
parties other than their customers, market 
power prevents efficient market contracting 
for most smaller customers and hence it 
should be expected that such firms will not 
be governed so as to reflect those 
customers’ preferences. This parallels the 
classic principal-agent problem as between 
shareholders and managers where 
ownership and control of the firm do not 
coincide (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). In 
this case third-party regulation might be 
expected to force a better alignment of 
owner and customer preferences, the 
mitigation of market power abuse in 
particular. But just as the separation of 
distribution ownership from customer 
patronage can be predicted to harm 
distribution customers, the separation of 
regulators and customers must also be 
predicted to impose costs on those 
customers. The problem is to some extent 
transformed without being eliminated. 
Indeed, Laffont and Tirole (1991) explain 
how the distribution company managers’ 
dual accountability – to both shareholders 
and the regulator – gives rise to additional 
inefficiencies. In any case, an imposition of 
third-party regulation stands in place of 
market-based solutions to any problems of 
distribution market power, such as 
customer ownership. 
Figure 1 illustrates the multiple 
governance relationships, with conflicts of 
interest possible for each, arising under 
different ownership and regulation 
permutations (ignoring third party conflicts). 
Panel (a) applies whether the monopoly is 
state- or investor-owned, with 
government/owner conflicts under state  
ownership referring to any conflicting 
objectives arising under state ownership 
(e.g. efficiency versus equity). As for Panel 
(b), the distribution company’s managers  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Governance conflicts 
(represented by arrows) 
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Customer-
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Customer Ownership
Without Regulation
(c)
  
must satisfy two masters, with inevitable 
tradeoffs and costs. In both cases an 
elaborate governance apparatus – 
regulation mediated via the political 
process – stands in the place of 
competition and other market-based 
solutions to the monopoly problem. While 
this apparatus is intended to serve an 
obvious purpose in Panel (a), it 
complements or even conflicts with the 
moderating role of customer ownership in 
Panel (b), adding costs but potentially 
without any additional benefits. Panel (c) 
illustrates the most parsimonious solution 
to aligning customer and distribution 
company manager interests. Potential 
conflicts with government remain even in 
this case, although they should be reduced 
to the extent that customer ownership is an 
effective buffer against market power 
abuse. It is difficult, a priori, to predict 
which permutation of ownership and 
regulation should most effectively serve 
customers, but it is easy to see how 
governance conflicts might arise most 
under Panel (a), subject to any offsets 
between conflicts, and how Panel (b) might 
involve unnecessary costs. In any case, the 
alignment between firm/manager and 
customer incentives will be weakest in 
Panel (a), with customer ownership 
providing a stronger alignment, and hence 
governance benefits, in Panels (b) and (c). 
 
4.2. Efficient Organizational Forms 
 
Hansmann (1996) argues that when left 
to market forces, ownership of 
organizations will fall to those organization 
patrons who bear the lowest sum of two 
types of cost: 
• The costs of market contracting; and 
• The costs of ownership. 
In our case the costs of market 
contracting include the costs to distribution 
company customers of market power 
abuse. These costs might be expected to 
vary inversely with customer size, as larger 
distribution company customers should 
have greater capacity than smaller ones to 
negotiate supply contracts on favourable 
terms. Hansmann treats the costs of 
regulation as implicit in the costs of market 
contracting. In this paper we treat these 
costs as a third, distinct class faced by 
distribution customers, to emphasise the 
tradeoffs of interest. 
Conversely, the costs of ownership 
include Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
“agency costs” arising where distribution 
company owners do not themselves 
manage those companies, such as the 
costs of managerial slackness, excessive 
perks or inefficient investments, and the 
costs of mechanisms to reduce such costs 
(e.g. incentive-based compensation, audit 
costs and other monitoring). Ownership 
costs also include the costs of collective 
decision-making, which increase with the 
number and heterogeneity of owners.  
Using this framework Hansmann then 
explains the predominance of various 
organizational forms over a wide range of 
economic activities. He explains the 
dominance of customer cooperatives in the 
rural US as a consequence of their 
minimisation of the costs of both market 
power and regulation, and advantageous 
costs of ownership. The latter advantage 
arises due to the relative homogeneity of 
distribution service quality and rural 
distribution customers, as well as stable 
customer base, implying relatively low 
levels of inter-member conflicts and hence 
low costs of collective decision-making. 
Despite rural distribution’s relatively high 
capital intensity (low customer density) 
compared with urban networks, it remains 
highly bankable and hence requires 
relatively little by way of member equity, 
reducing members’ investment risk and 
mitigating well-known problems of 
cooperative member exit and entry (e.g. 
Evans and Guthrie (2002)). 
By contrast he argues that municipal 
(i.e. local authority) owned utilities, in which 
customers have more diffuse control over 
the distribution activities mediated via local 
political processes, represent an efficient 
ownership solution to the greater 
heterogeneity and transience of urban 
customers. Both features increase scope 
for conflicts of interest among present and 
future customers, and hence imply higher 
costs of collective decisions, which must be 
weighed against the benefits of more direct 
customer ownership of distribution. 
By extension, state ownership of 
distribution companies is an extreme 
example of municipal ownership. It involves 
  
the weakest correlation between market 
power costs and compensatory customer 
returns via state ownership of any 
monopoly profits. It also involves the most 
attenuated customer participation in 
distribution company governance. In this 
case customer ownership is so indirect as 
to be an inefficient solution to market power 
abuse, suggesting a need for regulation. 
Should regulation be imposed in this case, 
however, the costs of state ownership must 
then be weighed against those of private 
ownership in determining distribution’s 
optimal organizational form, given the costs 
of market power and regulation, with 
regulated non-customer private (i.e. 
investor) ownership being an obvious 
contender. 
It should be noted that models of 
customer ownership are not confined to 
US-style non-profit customer cooperatives. 
Customer trust ownership of for-profit 
distribution companies, as in New Zealand, 
is another model. In certain circumstances 
cooperatives represent an efficient 
ownership form, but also feature well-
known governance and hence efficiency 
problems (Hart and Moore (1998), Porter 
and Scully (1987)). The fact that they 
survive despite such deficiencies suggests 
the scale of the market power problems 
they address. Alternative forms of 
cooperative, such as those operating for-
profit and allowing members to trade 
ownership at market value (inter alia) are 
predicted to result in greater efficiency 
(Cook and Iliopoulos (1999), Evans and 
Guthrie (2002)).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
survey the relative efficiencies of each 
ownership form, but sufficient to note that 
multiple classes of customer ownership are 
possible. We now compare selected 
permutations of ownership and regulation 
to help identify where ownership and 
regulation appear most substitutable, 
simply assuming some unspecified form of 
customer ownership as one alternative. 
 
5. ASSESSING THE ALTERNATIVES 
 
5.1. Relative Costs 
 
Table 1 compares the relative combined 
governance costs arising under state, 
investor and customer ownership, both with 
and without regulation. The cost classes 
chosen reflect dimensions materially 
different in each case, but ignore 
dimensions expected to be relatively alike 
under each scenario. 
 
Table 1. Relative combined governance 
costs 
 
Cost Class Ownership 
Class, and 
Regulation 
Market 
Power 
Owner-
ship 
Price 
Regulation 
State: 
• Regulated 
• Unregulated 
 
Low 
? 
 
High 
High 
 
Med. 
Nil 
Investor: 
• Regulated 
• Unregulated 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
Low 
 
High 
Nil 
Customer: 
• Regulated 
• Unregulated 
 
Low 
Low 
 
Med. 
Med. 
 
Med. 
Nil 
 
 
5.2. State Ownership 
 
Assuming regulation is effective, market 
power should be checked with regulation. 
Absent regulation the costs of market 
power under state ownership are unclear. 
Government may exploit market power for 
non-customer related (e.g. fiscal) goals, or 
weak ownership might foster monopolistic 
inefficiencies (e.g. X-inefficiency). 
Alternatively, state ownership might provide 
a buffer against market power abuse. 
Ownership costs are relatively high due 
to higher agency costs and associated 
inefficiencies (e.g. more diffuse objectives, 
fewer managerial monitoring and incentive 
options, lack of takeover threat), and high 
costs of collective decision-making due to 
heterogeneous interests and variation in 
interest concentration. 
Direct regulation costs should be lowest 
under state ownership. Indirect costs would 
be significant, although possibly less than 
under investor ownership due to its softer 
objectives dampening regulatory distortions 
(such as on investment). As for the other 
two ownership classes, no costs from price 
regulation arise in its absence. 
 
  
5.3. Investor Ownership 
 
Market power costs are highest under 
unregulated investor ownership, in the 
main due to its tight profit focus. Assuming 
regulation is effective, these costs should 
be attenuated. 
Conversely, investor ownership is 
argued to carry the lowest agency costs 
and associated inefficiencies, in the main 
due to its relatively tight objective function 
(profit maximisation) and greater array of 
options for monitoring, incentivizing and 
sanctioning management (e.g. alienable 
ownership, market for corporate control). 
Regulation costs will be highest in this 
case, not only because the direct costs of 
regulation will be high, but also because 
regulatory distortions should be their worst 
with investor ownership’s tight profit focus. 
 
5.4. Customer Ownership 
 
Market power costs should be the 
lowest under customer ownership, whether 
or not there is regulation. Customers can 
influence the firm’s objective function 
and/or share in any excess returns. 
Ownership costs will lie between those 
of investor and state ownership, reflecting 
governance inefficiencies such as those 
noted for cooperatives, in part due to softer 
objectives and managerial disciplines, but 
also because of the conflicts of interest and 
higher collective decision-making costs 
arising with mixed owner-customer 
objectives and exacerbated by member 
heterogeneity and transience. 
Regulation costs will be intermediate, 
since customer ownership’s broader 
objectives and/or softer profit focus will 
dampen the effects of regulatory 
distortions. Regulated customer-owned 
firms, like investor-owned firms, otherwise 
bear the full costs of regulation. 
 
5.5. Overall rankings 
 
For a local distribution concern customer 
ownership should be superior to state 
ownership whether price-regulated or not. 
This stems from lower ownership costs, 
likely comparable regulation costs, and 
uniformly low market power costs. The 
ownership cost advantage is primarily due 
to superior governance arising from more 
direct customer-owner control, but possibly 
also in other agency cost and efficiency 
terms. It is perhaps for these reasons that 
state ownership of distribution, except via 
fully integrated electric utilities, is less 
common than municipal or customer 
ownership. 
Despite the likely agency cost and 
efficiency advantages to investor 
ownership, once regulation costs are 
considered it is unclear whether regulated 
private ownership is superior to state 
ownership. This conclusion mirrors that of 
Laffont and Tirole (1991), and is consistent 
with the mixed empirical evidence on the 
relative performance of state- and investor-
owned electric utilities (see the survey in 
Willner (2001)). 
The clearest prediction is that regulated 
customer ownership should be a 
dominated ownership form, with 
unregulated customer ownership uniformly 
better or equal. In this case the costs of 
regulation are deadweight loss since 
ownership already resolves monopoly 
concerns, thus the imposition of regulation 
increases costs (including those of 
bankruptcy risks and investment 
distortions) without enhancing welfare.  
Perhaps controversially, in the light of 
the significant costs of regulation it cannot 
be ruled out that unregulated investor 
ownership is just as preferable to state 
ownership as unregulated customer 
ownership. In this case market power costs 
will be higher, but the efficiencies of 
investor ownership may be sufficient to tip 
the balance. In political terms unregulated 
customer ownership would likely be a more 
defensible option. 
 
6. EXTENSION TO TRANSMISSION 
 
For the same reasons that customer 
ownership can be an efficient solution to 
distribution’s natural monopoly, it is natural 
to enquire as to whether this remains the 
case for upstream transmission. As noted 
earlier, US distribution cooperatives often 
combine to own upstream G&T 
cooperatives, in some cases continuing to 
avoid rate regulation. But what about direct 
customer ownership of transmission? 
  
A significant difference between 
distribution and transmission is the former’s 
location-specificity versus the latter’s 
widespread (often national) coverage. This 
implies much greater ultimate customer 
heterogeneity, and coordination and 
investment issues, raising the costs of 
direct customer ownership – collective 
decision-making in particular. For this 
reason the balance of convenience might 
well shift from customer towards 
(unregulated) investor ownership, unless 
means were available to mitigate the higher 
costs of customer ownership for 
transmission. 
Once again, the voluntary formation of 
cooperative-owned G&T cooperatives 
provides insight. The additional layer of 
governance between distribution 
cooperative customers and transmission 
managers raises the agency costs of 
ownership. However, a multi-lateral 
governance structure, via this intermediary 
layer, moderates collective decision-
making costs and represents an efficient 
trade-off against the higher governance 
costs borne by customers through state or 
investor ownership of transmission. It also 
locates investment decisions near those 
bearing the costs of indecision and error. 
This model reflects that recommended 
but never adopted in New Zealand, with 
1989 recommendations that distribution 
companies “club” own the national grid 
operator (Evans and Meade (2005)). It also 
reflects the model temporarily adopted in 
the early 1990s in England and Wales, with 
regional electricity company (REC) 
ownership of the national grid company. In 
the former case the proposal failed in part 
due to distributor reluctance to finance the 
required purchase, and in the latter was 
abandoned amidst competition concerns 
associated with REC ownership of 
generation. As discussed in Evans and 
Meade (2005), there is good reason to 
separate generation ownership from any 
model of integrated transmission and 
distribution. Aside from the anti-competitive 
possibilities of subsidising competitive 
generation from monopoly operations, 
there is the additional problem of 
generators preferring grid congestion and 
inefficient grid investments (expanded on in 
Evans and Meade (2001)). 
 
7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Glachant (2002, 14)) notes that “some 
externalities and asset specificities can be 
managed within private clubs of partners or 
users, limiting the scope of intervention by 
public regulatory bodies.” The evidence 
and analysis above illustrates customer 
ownership solutions reducing the need for 
regulatory intervention. Indeed, it highlights 
the net welfare loss possible with the 
regulation of already-customer owned 
distribution and transmission. It also 
cautions against the automatic adoption of 
regulation where customer ownership 
options are feasible, since they may in fact 
be considerably more efficient than other 
ownership forms. 
Furthermore, with unregulated customer 
ownership being an efficient “regulatory” 
option, there is merit in regulators offering 
regulatory “menus” conditioned on 
ownership. For example, where customer-
owned distribution companies are offered 
for sale, regulation might be applied as a 
consequence of ownership passing to 
investors (or government). Based on the 
above, this imposition under even investor 
ownership may be welfare-reducing. 
Conversely, if control of investor-owned 
distribution passes to customers, this would 
justify the abandonment of regulation for so 
long as it persists (subject to anti-gaming 
provisions). 
Finally, when electricity reformers 
consider unbundling options, this analysis 
implies that different issues arise 
depending on whether distribution (and 
transmission) are customer-owned or not. 
The general implication being that a 
uniform regulatory approach across all 
ownership classes is unlikely to be 
necessary or desirable. 
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